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We study the problem of what causes prices to change. It is well known that
trading impacts prices – orders to buy drive the price up, and orders to sell drive
it down. We introduce a means of decomposing the total impact of trading into
two components, defining the mechanical impact of a trading order as the change
in future prices in the absence of any future changes in decision making, and the
informational impact as the remainder of the total impact once mechanical impact is
removed. This decomposition is performed using order book data from the London
Stock Exchange. The average mechanical impact of a market order decays to zero
as a function of time, at an asymptotic rate that is consistent with a power law with
an exponent of roughly 1.7. In contrast the average informational impact builds to
approach a constant value. Initially the impact is entirely mechanical, and is about
half as big as the asymptotic informational impact. The size of the informational
impact is positively correlated to mechanical impact. For cases where the mechanical
impact is zero for all times, we find that the informational impact is negative, i.e.
buy market orders that have no mechanical impact at all generate strong negative
price responses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What causes prices to change? Despite a
great deal of research on this subject the an-
swer remains far from clear. On one hand,
everyone agrees that prices respond to infor-
mation – good news drives prices up and bad
news drives it down. On the other hand,
2prices often change even when there is lit-
tle information, sometimes by large amounts
[1, 2]. How much of price changes are in-
formation driven, and how much are due to
other factors?
At an immediate level it is clear that trad-
ing is an important cause of price change.
When a trade is initiated by a buyer, the
price tends to go up, and when it is initi-
ated by a seller, it tends to go down. The
change in prices associated with a given trade
is called price impact (or alternatively mar-
ket impact), and has now been extensively
studied [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. Price impact says
nothing about why trades are made: They
could be made because of new information
or they could be made at random, for ex-
ample, because a participant needs cash for
reasons that are unrelated to anything go-
ing on in the market. This is further com-
plicated by the fact that market participants
regard trading and the price changes it pro-
duces as important signals about private in-
formation [21, 22]. When market participants
observe a change in price, they may reason
that others have private information, which
may cause them to trade, setting off a cascad-
ing avalanche of price changes whose origin is
difficult to ascertain.
Why do trades have price impact? One
cause is mentioned above – they reflect infor-
mation, and this information is incorporated
in price changes. There is, however, an even
more fundamental reason: When a trading
order is placed it causes purely mechanical
changes in prices. The word “mechanical”
refers to the component of price changes that
is deterministic, that occurs under the rules of
the auction (dependent on the set of queued
trading orders) even in the absence of any in-
formation. Although the mechanical impact
of trading is often discussed (see, e.g. Hop-
man [13]), up to this point no one has offered
a precise definition of what it means, or made
any suggestions as to how it can be measured.
In this paper we take advantage of the fact
that in most modern financial markets prices
are formed using a continuous double auction
(see Section IIA). Once the sequence of trad-
ing orders are given, the auction proceeds ac-
cording to deterministic rules, acting as a de-
terministic dynamical system with exogenous
inputs. While the placement of trading orders
may depend on complicated factors, once the
sequence of trading orders is given, price for-
mation is purely mechanical.
We propose a definition for mechanical im-
pact and introduce a practical method to
compute it. The mechanical impact of a trad-
ing order can be defined as the change in fu-
ture prices that occurs even if no other trad-
ing orders are changed in any way. This can
be computed by introducing hypothetical al-
terations in the size of a trading order, and
using the deterministic nature of the continu-
ous double auction to simulate their effect on
the future price sequence, holding all other
aspects of the trading order sequence con-
stant. In contrast, the informational impact
of a trading order is what is left of the to-
tal impact after the mechanical impact is re-
moved, i.e. it is the component that depends
on relationships between orders. As discussed
in Section VIIA, this can be either the causal
effect that a given order has on future orders,
or correlated effects between the placement of
orders (e.g. due to a common cause). More
precise definitions are given in Section III.
We find that mechanical impact behaves
very differently than informational impact.
The immediate effect of placing an order is
entirely mechanical. The average mechani-
cal impact decays to zero monotonically in
time, although at a slow rate. The long
time behavior is consistent with the hypothe-
sis of a power law, with an exponent of about
1.7. In contrast, informational impact grows
3with time and approaches a constant value,
at least over the time horizon where statis-
tics remain reliable. On average the initial
mechanical impact is about half the asymp-
totic informational impact. We find that the
integrated mechanical impact and the infor-
mational impact are positively correlated, ex-
cept for the special case when the mechanical
impact is identically zero. In this case the
informational impact is on average non-zero,
with the opposite sense that one normally ex-
pects (i.e. buy orders with zero mechanical
impact generate negative price impact).
This paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II gives a brief summary of the properties
of our data set and gives some background in-
formation about the functioning of the con-
tinuous double auction and the London Stock
Exchange. In Section III we give more pre-
cise definitions of total price impact and its
decomposition into mechanical and informa-
tional components. We then measure the av-
erage impacts and durations for real data in
Section IV. In Section V we study the effects
of long-memory in amplifying mechanical im-
pact. In Section VI we study the correlations
between mechanical and information impact.
Finally in Section VII we discuss the impli-
cations and future directions of this work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Continuous double auction
We give a brief review of the continuous
double auction, which is the most common
mechanism used for trading in modern finan-
cial markets, and define some terminology
that will be essential in the remainder of the
paper. “Continuous” refers to the fact that
the market is asynchronous, so that trading
orders can be placed at any time, and orders
are received one at a time, so there is unique
ordering of events. “Double” refers to the
fact that both buyers and sellers are allowed
to update their orders at will. Orders con-
tain both a trading quantity and a limit price,
which is the worst price the trader is willing
to accept1. The queue of unexecuted orders
is called the limit order book. A transaction
is generated whenever an order crosses the
prices of orders of the opposite sign, e.g. if a
buy order has a higher price than the lowest
priced sell order. In this case we would say
that the transaction is buyer-initiated; sim-
ilarly, if a sell order crosses the best price,
we say that the transaction is seller-initiated.
If an order does not generate an immediate
transaction, it is added to the limit order
book without a transaction taking place. It
is also possible to cancel an order sitting in
the limit order book at any time.
Real markets have a variety of different
types of possible orders that vary from mar-
ket to market, but for our purposes it is pos-
sible to categorize all orders into three types
of events: Effective market orders, defined as
any order or component of an order that gen-
erates a transaction; Effective limit orders,
defined as any order or component of an order
that does not generate an immediate trans-
action, and effective cancellations, defined as
any removal of an order from the limit order
book without a transaction taking place. Our
notion of effective events may not be in one-
to-one correspondence with the actual orders
that are placed. For example, in a situation
where the lowest priced sell order on the book
is to sell 1000 shares at 50 pounds, an order
to buy 3000 shares at 50 pounds will result
1 Sometimes the desired price is omitted, indicating
a willingness to accept any price. This is called a
market order. A buy market order is equivalent to
a limit order with an infinite limit price, and a sell
market order is equivalent to a limit price of zero.
4in a transaction for 1000 shares at 50 pounds
and leave a buy order sitting in the book for
2000 shares. This event corresponds to two
effective orders, an effective market order fol-
lowed by an effective limit order.
The LSE has two parallel markets, the on-
book market and the off-book market. The
on-book market operates via a continuous
double auction as described above, in which
the limit order book is transparently visible
to everyone, but the identities of those plac-
ing the orders are concealed. The off-book
market operates through a bilateral exchange
in which agents contact each other via the
telephone or message boards and know the
identity of the agent they are trading with.
Trades in the off-book market are revealed
only after they occur, and the intention to
trade beforehand is only communicated to
a limited circle of contacts. For this rea-
son the on-book market is widely regarded
as the dominant force in price formation. It
accounts for more than half the number of
trades and about half the trading volume.
Here we study only data from the on-book
market.
B. Data
For the purpose of this study we have used
the TDS (Transaction Data Service) data
set for the on-book market of the London
Stock Exchange (LSE). The data set con-
sists of records of orders placed or cancelled
within a 3 year period during 2000-2002.
We study three of the most liquid stocks,
Astrazeneca (AZN), Vodafone (VOD), and
Lloyds (LLOY). We will use AZN for all the
figures in the paper, but we have repeated all
the analyses for the other stocks as well. Or-
ders placed during opening and closing auc-
tions are excluded. The resulting reduced
data set contains about 570K transactions
and 3.7M events for AZN, 1.0M transactions
and 4.0M events for VOD, and 600K trans-
actions and 2.9M events for LLOY.
We have done some cleaning to reduce
problems due to data errors. Because the
data set contains both a record of transac-
tions and a record of order placements we
can test to be sure that both records are
consistent. We find some problems that we
do our best to correct. E.g. there are a
few cases where orders are placed that are
never removed. We remove such orders. A
more serious problem is that the sequencing
of the orders is not accurate for orders that
are placed within the same second. This often
results in nonsensical behavior, such as neg-
ative spreads. When this occurs we reorder
the data to eliminate these problems. This re-
ordering is not always unique. However, this
is rare, so that the overall probability that an
order is out of sequence is much less than one
percent. Mis-orderings have a small effect at
very short time scales (e.g. a few events), but
essentially no effect on longer time scales.
In working with the data we have to deal
with the problem of interday boundaries. Be-
cause the market closes at night and over
weekends, there are gaps in the data, and the
behavior of the data across these gaps can
be quite different than that within a trad-
ing day. To cope with this problem we have
tried two different approaches. One is to re-
ject any situations where we cross interday
boundaries. The other is to include situa-
tions that cross interday boundaries, but to
remove price changes that occur outside the
period of our analysis. We use the latter ap-
proach for the results presented here, but we
do not find that it makes a big difference in
our results.
5III. DECOMPOSING PRICE IMPACT
A. Total price impact
Throughout this paper we work with the
logarithmic midprice pt, which is defined as
the average of the logarithm of the best price
for a sell order and the logarithm of the best
price for a buy order. The total price im-
pact of an event at time t is defined as the
difference between the price just before the
event and the price τ time units later, i.e.,
∆pTτ (t) = pt+τ − pt. Letting st be the sign of
an event at time t, we can merge buy and sell
orders together and define the average total
price impact2 as
RT (τ) = 〈st(pt+τ−pt)〉 =
1
N
N∑
t=1
st(pt+τ−pt),
where N is the size of the sample and 〈〉 indi-
cates a time average over time t. This lumps
together the price impact of buy orders (posi-
tive events) and sell orders (negative events).
In general these are different, but the differ-
ence is small and negligible for our purpose
here.
We have used two time units in this study:
One is event time, where an event is an effec-
tive limit order, an effective market order, or
a cancellation. The other is transaction time,
where a transaction is defined as an effective
market order3. The price corresponding to
2 The multiplication by the sign avoids problems
associated with asymmetries between buying and
selling. This was introduced in reference [16],
where it is called the response function.
3 An effective market order may transact with sev-
eral different orders in the limit order book. From
the point of view of transaction time we consider
this a single transaction.
time t is defined to be just before the event or
transaction occurs, and incremented by one
immediately after that. For AZN about 17%
of events in the data cause immediate trans-
actions (i.e. market buy/sell events). Hence,
for AZN every unit of transaction-time is the
equivalent of roughly 7 event-time units. For
AZN on average one transaction time unit =
40 seconds4.
B. Mechanical impact
We define the mechanical impact in terms
of the change in the midprice when an event
is removed, but all other events are held con-
stant. The idea is to measure the component
of price change that is purely due to the pres-
ence of the event, excluding any effects that
are caused by related changes in the sequence
of events. For the purposes of this paper we
base our definition on the removal of events,
but this is not the only possibility – one can
also use addition or partial additional or re-
moval, as discussed in Section VIIB.
Our definition of mechanical impact takes
advantage of the fact that, under the rules
of the continuous double auction, any initial
limit order book and sequence of events gen-
erates a unique sequence of limit order books,
which correspond to a unique sequence of
midprices. The auction A can be regarded
as a deterministic function
bt+1 = A(bt, ωt)
4 The definition of mechanical impact that we pro-
pose here relies on the use of natural time units,
such as event time or transaction time, as opposed
to real time units (seconds). The number of events
in any fixed interval of real time is highly vari-
able, and so it is not clear how one would formulate
Equation 2 in real time.
6that maps an event ωt and a limit order book
bt onto a new limit order book bt+1. The
event ωt can be an effective market order,
limit order or cancellation, as described in
Section IIA. For a given sequence of events
Ωt+τt+1 = {ωt+1, ωt+2, . . . , ωt+τ} the auction A
can be iterated to generate the limit order
book bt+τ at time t+ τ ,
bt+τ = A(bt,Ω
t+τ
t+1).
The continuous double auction can thus be
thought of as a deterministic dynamical sys-
tem with initial condition bt and exogenous
input Ωt+1.
Each limit order book bt defines a unique
logarithmic midprice pt = p(bt). Simplifying
the notation, we write the composition of the
auction operator A and the midpoint price
operator p as Π = p ◦A. Thus, for any initial
limit order book bt and event sequence Ω
t+τ
t+1
the logarithmic midprice at time t + τ is
pt+τ = Π(bt,Ω
t+τ
t+1). (1)
There are a couple of situations that de-
serve more discussion. First, for the mid-
price to be well-defined it is necessary that
the limit order book contain at least one order
to buy and one order to sell. This is not al-
ways the case. For example for AZN, which is
one of the more liquid stocks in the LSE, out
of roughly 3.7 million events we observe 171
cases where the midprice is not well-defined.
Such situations become more common for less
liquid stocks. In the case where this happens,
we simply say that the price is undefined. In
our empirical work we discard such cases.
The second potentially problematic situa-
tion occurs when there is a cancellation of an
order that does not exist. The most common
cause of this is the lag between the receipt of
information and the time needed to react to
implement a cancellation, which can result in
an order being executed before it can be can-
celled. There are 231 cases of this for AZN
during the period of our sample. When this
occurs the exchange simply ignores the can-
cellation. We do the same, treating the can-
cellation as a null event, i.e. one that leaves
the limit order book unchanged.
For the purposes of this paper we define
the mechanical impact of an event ωt in terms
of its effect on the price under its hypothet-
ical removal. More precisely, making use of
Equation 1, we define the mechanical impact
∆pMτ (t) as
∆pMτ (t) = Π(bt,Ω
t+τ
t+1)−Π(bt−1,Ω
t+τ
t+1). (2)
In other words, the mechanical impact of
event ωt at time t+τ is the difference between
the real price Π(bt,Ω
t+τ
t+1) and the hypotheti-
cal price Π(bt−1,Ω
t+τ
t+1) when ωt is removed,
but the subsequent sequence of events is left
the same. The real price contains both the in-
formational and mechanical impact, while the
hypothetical price contains only the informa-
tional impact, so that under subtraction only
the mechanical impact remains. This isolates
the part of the price impact that is “purely
mechanical”, in the sense that it is generated
solely by the effect of placing an order in the
book and observing its effect under the de-
terministic operation of the continuous dou-
ble auction. Although we have not been able
to prove this, we conjecture that when ωt is
a buy order (st = +1) the continuous double
auction guarantees that ∆pMτ ≥ 0 for all τ ,
and for sell orders (st = −1) ∆p
M
τ ≤ 0. In
our empirical investigations we have not seen
any exceptions to this conjecture. For τ ≤ 0
the mechanical impact is by definition zero.
Removing an order to compute the me-
chanical impact increases the number of can-
cellations of orders that do not exist. For
example, suppose that in the real event se-
quence the buy market order ωt removes a
sell limit order ωˆ. When we generate the hy-
pothetical sequence by removing ωt, ωˆ is left
in the book, so that the best ask price remains
7lower than it did in the real sequence. This
can cause a subsequent buy limit order to be
executed that would otherwise have remained
in the book and later been cancelled. When
this occurs, as already stated, we treat this
as a null event. For AZN, for example, we
find that about 35% of the time removing ωt
generates at least one cancellation of a nonex-
istent order, i.e. 19% of the time there is one
such event, 7% of the time two such events,
etc., for an average of 0.73 such events per
removal.
In the hypothetical series we also observe
a slight increase in the number of undefined
prices. For AZN, for example, this happens
in 0.01% of the cases, in contrast to 0.003%
for the real series. We omit these cases from
our analysis.
Finally, we need to deal with the possi-
bility that the assignment of effective orders
might alter the number of events in the hy-
pothetical series. This can happen, for exam-
ple, because an order that is fully executed in
the real series, and was therefore an effective
market order, is now only partially executed,
and so becomes an effective market order fol-
lowed by an effective limit order. We deal
with this by preserving the alignment of the
hypothetical and real data series based on the
real events. This prevents the possibility of
a persistent misalignment which could create
a persistent artificial price difference between
the two series. In any case we find that such
situations are rare.
In this paper we study only the impact of
effective market orders. In Figure 1 we show
a typical example comparing a real price se-
quence to a hypothetical price sequence with
a buy order removed5. It is clear that the
5 The TDS data set comes with a series of bids and
offers computed by the exchange. These do not
always match the prices that we compute by ap-
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FIG. 1: (a) Initial and modified price sequences
for the removal of a buy market order and (b) the
resulting mechanical impact (which is just the
difference between the two price series in (a)).
Note that this figure and all other figures in this
paper are based on the stock AZN. Prices are in
pence and impacts are in units of average spread.
plying the continuous double auction algorithm to
the event series. For consistency of comparison be-
tween the real and hypothetical series, we use the
latter.
8mechanical impact is highly variable. To give
the reader a feeling for the variety of possi-
bilities, in Figure 2 we show a set of four ex-
amples of the mechanical impact of effective
market orders6 . The mechanical impact is
highly variable. In some cases there is an ini-
tial burst of mechanical impact, which dies to
zero and then remains there. In some cases
there are long gaps in which the impact re-
mains at zero and then takes on nonzero val-
ues after more than a thousand transactions.
In other cases there is no mechanical impact
at all.
C. Informational impact
The informational impact is defined as the
portion of total impact that cannot be ex-
plained by mechanical impact, i.e.
∆pIτ = ∆p
T
τ −∆p
M
τ .
Whatever components of the total impact not
explained by mechanical impact must be due
to correlations between the order ωt and other
events. With the data we have it is impossi-
ble to say whether the placement of the or-
der ωt causes changes in future events Ωt+1,
or whether the properties of Ωt+1 are corre-
lated with those of ωt due to a common cause.
In either case, changes in price that are not
caused mechanically must be due to informa-
tion – either the information contained in ωt
affecting Ωt+1, or external information affect-
ing both ωt and Ωt+1. See the discussion in
Section VIIA.
6 In this and the remaining figures we compute im-
pacts in units of the average spread. For each stock
and the full time period of each data set, the av-
erage spread is computed by sampling just before
transactions.
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FIG. 2: Examples of mechanical price impact (in
units of average spread) in transaction time. The
top two plots correspond to buy orders and the
bottom two to sell orders.
9IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF IMPACT
In this section we perform statistical anal-
ysis of average properties of price impact. For
the remainder of this paper we will only study
the impacts of effective market orders, defer-
ring the problem of studying effective limit
orders and cancellations.
A. Average impact
The first property we study is the aver-
age impact as a function of time. In Figure 3
we compare the average mechanical impact
RM(τ) = 〈st∆p
M
τ (t)〉t and the average total
impact RT (τ) = 〈st∆p
T
τ (t)〉t. For event time
the total impact and mechanical impact are
by definition the same at τ = 1. This is be-
cause in moving from τ = 0 to τ = 1 the
only event that affects the price is the ref-
erence event ωt – alterations in Ωt+1 cannot
effect ∆pT1 . For larger values of τ the me-
chanical impact decreases and the informa-
tional impact increases. Over the timescale
shown here (100 events), when measured in
units of the average spread, the mechanical
impact is initially about 0.17, and then de-
cays monotonically toward zero. In contrast
the total impact increases toward what ap-
pears to be an asymptotically constant value
slightly greater than 0.3. This the source of
our statement that the initial value of me-
chanical impact is about half the asymptotic
value of the total impact. Similar results are
observed for VOD and LLOY.
Figure 3(b) shows the same behavior in
transaction time. In this case the mechanical
impact and total impact diverge immediately
at τ = 1. This is not surprising, since one in-
crement of transaction time is equivalent to
roughly 6.8 increments of event time. The
initial gap between the total and the mechan-
ical impacts in transaction time is roughly,
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FIG. 3: Average mechanical impact RM(τ) =
〈st∆p
M
τ (t)〉t (red squares) and total impact
RT (τ) = 〈st∆p
T
τ (t)〉t (blue stars), in units of the
average spread, plotted in (a) event time and (b)
transaction time.
but not exactly consistent with the results in
event time7 at τ = 6.8. Once again, except
for statistical fluctuations the total impact
7 It is not possible to superimpose the event time
and transaction time curves by simply rescaling
the time axis. The reason is somewhat subtle. It
depends on the fact that transactions on average
have bigger effects on prices than other events. Be-
cause we create a hypothetical sequence by remov-
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FIG. 4: Average mechanical impact in units of
the average spread, plotted in double logarithmic
scale. The x’s are the data and the solid line
shows a power law fit to the tail.
appears to approach a constant value out to
τ = 100.
The total impact of market orders has
received extensive study in several different
markets [3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
Here we focus on the behavior as a function
of time [5, 6, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. Our results
on total impact are consistent with previous
results. We find that total impact builds with
time and appears to approach a constant,
up to the point where statistical fluctuations
make the results questionable.
In sharp contrast to the total impact, the
mechanical impact decays toward zero. To
get a better view in Figure 4 we plot the av-
ing market orders, each event time interval always
begins with a transaction, but between 6.8 events
there can be more than one transaction. For AZN
on average there are 1.2 transactions. As a result,
if one simply rescales the time axis by a factor of
6.8, the average mechanical impact in event time
is greater than that in transaction time.
erage mechanical impact for times up to 2000
transactions in log-log scale8. We fit a power
law of the formKτ−λ to what we subjectively
deem to be the asymptotic region of the tail.
For AZN we find λ = 1.6, for VOD λ = 1.8,
and for LLOY λ = 1.7. Given that the scaling
region is only over a little more than an order
of magnitude, this is certainly not convincing
evidence that the average mechanical impact
scales as a power law. Nonetheless, plotting
in semi-log coordinates makes it quite clear
that the decay is slower than exponential. We
have not attempted to put any error bars on
these estimates because they are difficult to
assign9. These should just be viewed as rep-
resentative values.
It is clear from simple theoretical argu-
ments that the mechanical impact must de-
cay to zero. From the definition of Equation 2
the only difference between the real price se-
ries and the hypothetical series with the or-
der removed is the initial order book bt. As
orders disappear from the order book the dif-
ference between the real and the hypotheti-
cal price series decreases. Once there are no
orders that were in the original order book
there is no longer any memory of the initial
condition, and there will no longer be any dif-
ference between the real and the hypothetical
price series. Previous studies suggest that the
distribution of times for an order to remain in
the book before being removed by a transac-
8 To make the fluctuations in the data clearer in this
and other figures, we have placed x’s at diminishing
intervals of time to get a better view in log-log
scale.
9 In addition to statistical fluctuations, there are
problems caused by the slow convergence to asymp-
totic scaling. Careful testing of the power law hy-
pothesis and proper assignment of error bars for
scaling exponents is beyond the scope of this pa-
per.
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tion decays as a power law with an exponent
near 1.5, and that the distribution of times
to cancellation decays as a power law with an
exponent near 2 [23, 24]. These both suggest
that we should expect an asymptotic power
law decay of the average mechanical impact,
though the precise argument linking these is
not clear.
Under the rules of the LSE no order can
persist for more than one month, which would
seem to imply an upper bound on the per-
sistence of the mechanical impact. However,
it is quite common for orders to be immedi-
ately replaced, so that from an effective point
of view some orders can persist for very long
times, e.g. six months or more [25]. For prac-
tical reasons related to limitations in compu-
tation time we have not measured the me-
chanical impact for time intervals longer than
2000 transactions, corresponding to a period
of about two trading days. This doesn’t ap-
pear to be an important restriction, since the
average mechanical impact at τ = 2000 is less
than three orders of magnitude less than its
initial value, and events where the mechani-
cal impact is non-zero for τ > 2000 are fairly
rare.
As already mentioned, the hypothetical se-
quences contain more cancellations of nonex-
istent orders, which are treated as null events.
We find that on average removals that gen-
erate more null events have larger mechani-
cal impact. This is not surprising, since the
generation of null events implies larger per-
turbations in the limit order book. (See the
example discussed in the paragraph following
Equation 2).
B. Duration and size
We define the duration of the mechani-
cal impact of an order as the largest τ for
which that order has a non-zero impact. Fig-
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FIG. 5: Distribution of mechanical impact dura-
tions. The top panel is the probability of each
duration, and the bottom panel covers a longer
time period on double logarithmic scale. The x’s
correspond to the empirical measurements, and
the line to a fit using ordinary least squares.
ure 5 shows a histogram of the durations in
transaction time. The most common dura-
tion is zero – in transaction time about 33%
of the events have no impact at all . The
duration probability decreases rapidly and
roughly monotonically. To get a better view
in Figure 5(b) we show this for a longer time
period in double logarithmic scale and fit a
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FIG. 6: The distribution of integrated mechani-
cal impact sizes SMτ (t), with τ = 2000. The x’s
are the real data and the solid line is a fit to
a power law. The units of the x axis are price
× time, where price differences are measured in
units of average spread and time is measured in
transactions.
power law Kτ−δ over what we subjectively
deem to be the tail. For AZN we estimate
δ = 1.5, for VOD δ = 1.7 and for LLOY
δ = 1.7.
Because mechanical impact is transitory,
we define a notion of size in terms of the im-
pact integrated over time. The integrated size
SMτ (t) up to time τ associated with the im-
pact event at time t is defined as
SMτ (t) =
τ∑
i=1
st∆p
M
i (t).
The distribution of integrated sizes is shown
in Figure 6 in double logarithmic scale. If we
fit a power law of the form Kτ−α for AZN we
find α = 3.3, for VOD α = 3.4, and for LLOY
α = 3.4. Given the small size of the scaling
region and the large size of the scaling expo-
nents, it is not at all clear that the integrated
impact size asymptotically scales as a power
law.
V. AMPLIFICATION BY
LONG-MEMORY
The effect of mechanical impact on prices
is amplified by the long-memory of the or-
der signs st. As we explain in more detail
below, the long-memory of order signs refers
to the strong tendency of buy orders to be
followed by more buy orders, and sell orders
to be followed by more sell orders. When we
compute mechanical impact we subtract the
price sequence associated with two series of
orders, both of which contain long-memory.
The long-memory is thus removed. Nonethe-
less, since buy orders generate positive me-
chanical impacts and sell orders generate neg-
ative mechanical impacts, the long-memory
of orders amplifies the mechanical impact of
any given order. In this section we make all
this more precise, compute the amplification
due to long-memory, and show that it is not
strong enough to create a persistent impact
from the transitory nature of individual me-
chanical impacts.
To make the definition of the long-memory
of order signs more precise, define
P+τ ) = P (st = 0 & st+τ = 0)
+P (st = 1 & st+τ = 1)
as the probability that transactions at time
t and t + τ have the same sign and simi-
larly P−τ as the probability that they have
the opposite sign. For all the stock markets
examined so far (Paris, London, NYSE) the
sequence of signs has long-memory, i.e. the
autocorrelation function decays as a power
law τ−γ [16, 17, 18, 19]. This also implies
that P+τ /P
−
τ − 1 ∼ τ
−γ . The exponent γ
appears to vary somewhat depending on the
market and the stock, but it is consistently
less than one. Long-memory is illustrated for
AZN in Figure 7. Lillo, Mike, and Farmer
[26] hypothesized that long-memory is caused
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FIG. 7: An illustration of the long-memory of
order signs. The ratio P+τ /P
−
τ − 1 is plotted on
double logarithmic scale (x’s) and compared to
a power law (line) with exponent γ = 0.59.
by strategic order splitting and presented re-
sults supporting the hypothesis. More recent
results that make use of transaction identity
codes strongly support this [27].
The long-memory of order signs creates a
puzzle because it naively suggests that prices
should be inefficient. Figure 7 makes it clear
that order signs are predictable based on
their past history. Given that buyer-initiated
trades have positive price impact and seller-
initiated trades have negative impact, this
suggests that price movements should also
be predictable. This is not the case: price
changes are essentially uncorrelated.
Two explanations have been offered to ex-
plain how transactions can have long-memory
while prices are efficient. One is due to
Bouchaud et al. [16, 17]. They postulate
the existence of a bare impact function G(τ),
such that the total impact is the sum of
the bare impact of each trade. If G(τ) de-
cays as a power law G(τ) ∼ τ−β , providing
β = (1 − γ)/2, due to the long-memory the
bare impacts will accumulate so that the to-
tal impact asymptotically approaches a con-
stant, i.e. the decay of the bare impact and
the amplification due to long-memory cancel
each other. Providing the constant is less
than half the spread (which is observed in
practice), the market is efficient [20].
The temporary nature of the average me-
chanical impact response function shown in
Figure 3 suggests that it might provide a fun-
damental explanation for the decay of the
bare impact G(τ). However, the average me-
chanical impact decays too fast for this to be
true. According to the formula of the previ-
ous paragraph, using γ = 0.6 implies a bare
propagator exponent of β = 0.2. This is much
smaller than the exponent λ = 1.6 measured
for mechanical impact. Thus it seems that
this cannot be the explanation. Instead, the
full explanation involves the existence of a
liquidity imbalance between buying and sell-
ing10. Nonetheless, the decaying nature of
the mechanical impact may play an impor-
tant role in making the bare impact tempo-
rary. The details of this remain to be worked
out.
When we compute the mechanical impact,
because the perturbed transaction sequence
and the reference sequence in Equation 2
both have long memory, after subtracting
them any effects due to long-memory dis-
appear. Nonetheless, it is clear that long-
10 The hypothesis of a liquidity imbalance between
buying and selling was offered by Lillo and
Farmer[18] and modified and demonstrated to be
effective by Farmer et al. [19]. When buyer-
initiated transactions become more likely, the liq-
uidity for buying increases and the liquidity for sell-
ing decreases (though with some time lag), making
the price responses to buy orders smaller on aver-
age than those to sell orders. This damps the effect
of the long-memory and keeps the market efficient.
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memory will amplify mechanical impact, for
the same reasons it amplifies the bare impact.
Let the cumulative impact of an order at time
τ be C(τ) and consider, for example, a buy
order. This generates a positive average im-
pact at τ = 1 of RM(1). At τ = 2 its average
impact is reduced to RM(2), but we also need
to take into account that the order at τ = 1
is more likely to be a buy order than a sell
order, so that there is an additional contribu-
tion (P+1 −P
−
1 )R
M(1). Similarly at τ = 3 the
average cumulative impact C(3) = RM(3) +
(P+1 −P
−
1 )R
M(2)+(P+2 −P
−
2 )R
M(1). Noting
that by definition P+0 = 1 and P
−
0 = 0, the
general expression is
C(τ) =
τ∑
i=1
(P+τ−i − P
−
τ−i)R
M(i) (3)
In Figure 8(a) we compare the raw mechan-
ical impact, the cumulative mechanical im-
pact C(τ) including amplification by long-
memory, the informational impact, and the
total impact. Plotting the mechanical im-
pact adjusted for long-memory on double log-
arithmic scale makes it clear that it is still
decaying to zero, albeit slower than the raw
mechanical impact. Fitting a power law to
the long-time behavior of the form Kτ−η, as
shown in Figure 8(b) gives an exponent of
about η = 0.6.
In conclusion, while it is clear that the cor-
relations associated with the long-memory of
order signs amplify mechanical impact, they
are not sufficiently strong to overcome the
rapid decay of the mechanical impact to make
it permanent.
VI. CORRELATION BETWEEN
MECHANICAL AND
INFORMATIONAL IMPACTS
We now study the correlation between me-
chanical and informational impact. Because
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FIG. 8: (a) A comparison of the average me-
chanical, informational, and total impacts with
and without adjustments for long-memory. In
ascending order we show the average mechani-
cal impact RM (τ), the mechanical impact C(τ)
adjusted for long-memory, the informational im-
pact adjusted for long-memory RT (τ) − C(τ),
the informational impact RT (τ) − RM(τ), and
the total impact RT (τ), all as a function of time.
In (b) we show C(τ) over a longer time period
in double logarithmic scale.
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mechanical impact is temporary, it is not
obvious what feature of mechanical impact
is likely to be most important. Studying
the correlation between mechanical and in-
formational impact is motivated in part by
the idea that prices are informative, i.e. as
agents observe price changes induced by oth-
ers, they update their own information. Since
mechanical impacts are temporary, it is not
clear what others will respond to, particu-
larly if the response is not instantaneous.
We somewhat arbitrarily use the integrated
size, though one could easily argue that other
properties of the mechanical impact might be
more reasonable. See the discussion in Sec-
tion VIIA.
In Figure 9 we plot the informational im-
pact at τ = 20 against the size of the mechan-
ical impact integrated up to τ = 20. The re-
lationship for individual transactions is very
noisy, but the positive association between
mechanical and informational impact is quite
clear. The correlation is ρ = 0.14. A linear
regression of the form ∆pI20(t) = aS20(t) + b
yields a positive slope a = 0.187 ± 0.003.
The error bar corresponds to a t-statistic of
55. It is computed under the assumption of
normally distributed IID data, and is cer-
tainly too optimistic, but it is nonetheless
quite clear that the correlation is highly sta-
tistically significant. Binning the data based
on the integrated size of the mechanical im-
pact shows that the relationship is essentially
monotonically increasing – large integrated
mechanical impacts are associated with large
informational impacts. The positive associ-
ation between informational and mechanical
impacts is clearly highly statistically signifi-
cant.
We find the surprising result that for cases
where the mechanical impact is strictly zero,
the informational impact has the opposite
sign that one would normally expect, e.g. buy
orders with strictly zero mechanical impact
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FIG. 9: The informational impact at τ = 20
vs. mechanical impact integrated up to τ = 20,
SM20 (t). In (a) the dots correspond to individual
transactions, and the line is a regression using
ordinary least squares. In (b) the data is binned
based on the integrated mechanical impacts, il-
lustrating that even though the relationship is
noisy, the correlation increases consistently with
increasing size. Note that the black square corre-
sponds to the case where the mechanical impact
is strictly zero.
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tend to have negative total price impacts.
(Recall that when the mechanical impact is
zero informational and total impact are the
same). Strictly zero means that the mechan-
ical impact is zero for all times in units of
event-time rather than transaction time (the
difference is situations where there is a non-
zero impact in event time that dies out be-
fore the first transaction). For AZN, for ex-
ample, 13% of effective market orders have
strictly zero mechanical impact, in contrast
to 33% in transaction time. To illustrate this
in Figure 9(b) we have added the strictly zero
case by placing two values over 0 on the x-
axis. The first is consistent with the rest
of the figure and corresponds to SM20 = 0,
while the square corresponds to cases where
the mechanical impact is strictly zero. The
average informational impact in the latter
case is 〈st∆p
I
20(t)〉t = −0.4, in contrast to
the case where SM20 = 0, which has roughly
〈st∆p
I
20(t)〉t = 0. Thus, as soon as there is
any nonzero mechanical impact at all, the
average informational impact jumps from a
strongly negative value to a positive value.
The relationship between mechanical and
informational impact remains consistent
through time. In Figure 10 we divide the
mechanical impact into four different groups
based on their mechanical impact and track
the informational impact through time. The
first group consists of the cases whose impact
is strictly zero and the others to the nonzero
mechanical impacts, which are sorted based
on SM20 into three groups with an equal num-
ber of events. As before, the behavior of
the informational impact when the mechan-
ical impact is strictly zero is quite different
than that when it is nonzero. When the me-
chanical impact is strictly zero, the informa-
tional impact has a slightly positive value at
τ = 1, but then becomes increasingly nega-
tive as τ increases. We hypothesize that this
occurs because orders with no mechanical im-
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FIG. 10: Informational impact as a function of
time for transactions with different levels of in-
tegrated mechanical impact. We show the aver-
age informational impact from τ = 1 to τ = 20
for three equal sized quantiles of the transac-
tions with nonzero integrated mechanical impact
S20(t), as well as for all transactions where the
mechanical impact is strictly zero.
pact at all tend to be associated with price re-
versals. For example, consider the case where
we remove a buy market order which is too
small to remove the best ask, in a situation in
which the price immediately drops. New sell
orders will fill in below the best ask. In this
case it is very unlikely that removal of the buy
market order will make any difference to the
midprice. In contrast, had the price contin-
ued to go up, the rearrangement in the level
of sell limit orders triggered by the removal
of the buy market order is much more likely
to generate a perturbation in the price series.
VII. SUMMARY
We have introduced a precise definition of
the mechanical impact of a transaction and
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demonstrated how it can be measured. The
time behavior of the mechanical impact is
highly variable. On average, however, for
market orders it is strongest immediately af-
ter the order is placed, and then decays to
zero over time. It is initially the dominant
component of the total price impact, but the
relative fraction decreases as the mechanical
impact shrinks and the informational impact
grows to approach its asymptotic value. Ini-
tially the mechanical impact is about half as
large as the asymptotic informational impact.
A. Causality
We have defined the informational impact
as what is left over of the total impact once
the purely mechanical impact is removed.
The justification for this is that the remain-
der depends on correlations between events.
I.e., unless there is something correlating the
information in the reference event ωt to the
subsequent sequence of events Ωt+1, there will
be no informational impact. This leaves open
the question of causality. One hypothesis is
that event ωt causes changes in the subse-
quent events Ωt+1. The alternative hypoth-
esis is that there is a common cause for ωt
and any aspects of Ωt+1 that are correlated
with its presence. Based on the information
available here we cannot distinguish these two
hypotheses.
The idea of a common cause is easy to un-
derstand. Suppose, for example, that an ex-
ternal event causes a group of investors to
decide to buy, and they submit a series of
buy orders without paying any attention to
each other. This will cause a rise in price
associated with each buy order, due both to
the mechanical impact of each buy order, and
the mechanical impact of all the buy orders
that are correlated with it. The correlated
part of the price rise will be measured as an
informational impact (reflecting the external
information).
The causal hypothesis is more interesting,
and is connected to the role of trading and its
associated price changes in transmitting in-
formation. In a world where individual agents
have private information, trading provides a
mechanism for disseminating that informa-
tion. If an agent receives new private infor-
mation, this may cause him or her to trade.
Trading affects the price, which is visible to
everyone. An intelligent agent with different
information will observe the change in price,
and will infer that his or her valuation must
be wrong. As a result, each agent will arrive
at a valuation that is based partly on private
information and partly on price and other
public information. Prices are thus a mech-
anism for making private information public.
This idea is well-accepted in economic theory
[21, 22].
Insofar as the causal hypothesis is correct,
the temporary nature of mechanical impact
suggests that private information is made
public through a highly dynamic process. As
each trade happens, it causes a mechanical
impact, which is a signal visible to all. Before
it decays away, it can cause other trades of the
same sign to occur, or it can cause cancella-
tions to occur, or (probably most important)
it can cause changes in the limit prices of sub-
sequent orders. Each of these events has its
own mechanical impact, creating a cascade
of impacts giving rise to a permanent change.
The avalanche-like nature of this process sug-
gests possible analogies to self-organized crit-
icality.
At this stage we are unable to say to what
extent common cause or causality are at play.
It seems likely that both are acting. We do
know that these series display long-memory,
and as discussed in Section V, evidence sug-
gests that this is essentially an exogenous
phenomenon, which from this point of view
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is a common cause.
B. Generalizations
The mechanical impact can be defined in
a way that is more general than what we have
presented here. We have defined mechanical
impact by fully removing an event, but there
are many other possible modifications of the
order book that are worth considering. Equa-
tion 2 can be generalized to read
∆pMτ (t) = Π(bt,Ω
t+τ
t+1)− Π(b˜t,Ω
t+τ
t+1) (4)
where bt is the real order book at time t and b˜t
is any modification of it that may yield a use-
ful interpretation. For example, b˜t might be
the true order book with an additional order
added, or it could be an infinitesimal modi-
fication of a given order, e.g. with the size
of the most recent order ωt slightly enhanced
or diminished. This potentially allows one to
make a quasi-continuous analysis, effectively
estimating the derivative of the mechanical
changes in prices with respect to changes in
supply or demand.
C. Future work
We have left many questions unanswered
in this work. In addition to the generaliza-
tion discussed above, there are many topics
that remain to be investigated. For example,
what is the dependence of mechanical impact
on the size of orders? Previous results have
shown that the total impact is remarkably in-
dependent of order size [28, 29]; is this also
true for mechanical impact? Is the mechani-
cal impact symmetric under increases or de-
creases in the size of ωt? What does the price
impact of cancellation and limit orders look
like? We hope to investigate these and other
questions in the future.
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